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Abstract
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the
unemployment spell is analyzed in an analytically tractable model allowing moral
hazard, adverse selection and hidden savings. Analytical results show that when
the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the unemployment spell,
benefits should typically increase or be constant. The only exception is when there
is moral hazard and no hidden savings. In general, adverse selection problems
calls for increasing benefits, moral hazard problems for constant benefits and
decreasing search productivity for decreasing benefits.
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The seminal paper by Shavell and Weiss (1979) characterized the optimal design of unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) when search activity is unobservable. Under such a moral hazard problem,
they concluded that unemployment beneﬁts should decline over the period the individual re-
mains unemployed. Intuitively, the fear of lower future consumption increases the incentives for
engaging in costly search, since active search reduces the probability of having to endure this
future lower consumption.
Much more recently, this analysis was extended by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), allow-
ing the insurer to control the consumption proﬁle also for working individuals, using a history
dependent wage tax. They conﬁrm the previous results that optimal unemployment beneﬁts
should decline over time. A key assumption in both papers is that the insurer can fully control
the individual’s consumption — usually interpreted as the individual having no access to markets
for saving and borrowing and no alternative sources of income. A large part of the welfare gains
from introducing the optimal UI plan is due to the insurer acting as a substitute bank vis-` a-vis
the individual. More importantly, there are ap r i o r ireasons for believing the assumption that
consumption can be fully controlled by the insurer to be important for the result that UI beneﬁts
should decrease over time. First, it is well known that precautionary savings are a good substi-
tute for insurance against short spells of unemployment (see, e.g. Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora
(1999)). Second, when individuals self-insure by building precautionary buﬀers, consumption
follows a proﬁle qualitatively similar to the optimal path in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) —
i) falling during unemployment as the buﬀer is depleted and ii) lower consumption paths for
individuals with a history of many and long unemployment spells.
There is empirical evidence indicating that precautionary saving is used in order to self-
insure against unemployment risk. Using PSID, Gruber (1997) ﬁnds that, in absence of UI,
consumption falls by 22% when an individual become unemployed, showing that individuals are
able to smooth consumption also when there is no UI. Similarly, Engen and Gruber (2001) shows
that UI crowds out ﬁnancial savings, indicating that households use the ﬁnancial markets for
self-insure against unemployment risk.1 The assumption that the insurer can perfectly control
individual consumption is thus not realistic. Furthermore, we will in this paper argue that
neither is it innocuous.
In the literature on UI design, two main approaches have been used. With optimal contract
theory, optimal UI design can be analyzed with few restrictions on the form of the insurance
scheme. Despite obvious advantages in terms of generality, this framework also has some draw-
backs. It has proven diﬃcult to relax the assumption of no hidden savings, only recently progress
has been made in this respect (see Pavoni (2001), Arpad and Pavoni (2002) and Werning (2002)).
1Also if access to the capital market is limited, alternative means to smooth consumption may exist, see e.g.,
Cullen and Gruber (2000).
2Furthermore, it is inherently very diﬃcult to handle multiple incentive problems and adverse se-
lection using optimal contract theory. Numerical analysis is the second main approach and,
e.g., Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu and Sahin (2002) show that beneﬁts should not necessarily be
decreasing while Heer (2000) reaches the opposite conclusion. Although numerical analysis al-
lows more realistic models and quantitative predictions, it is typically diﬃcult to understand the
mechanisms behind the results and to make conjectures about their generality.
In this paper, we will follow a third route. We will restrict individual preferences to be in the
class of constant absolute risk aversion and like, e.g., Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) focus on
two-tier beneﬁt systems allowing diﬀerent beneﬁts for the short-run and long-run unemployed. In
particular, while maintaining the assumption that consumption cannot be controlled as in Pavoni
(2001) and Werning (2002), we, in contrast, do not allow beneﬁts to be conditioned on the entire
individual employment history.2 While our assumptions come at some cost of reduced generality,
they also provide substantial beneﬁts. We can analytically characterize optimal beneﬁts using
standard economic tools when diﬀerent forms of asymmetric information coexist. Our results
can be graphically represented and easily interpreted.
As in the previous literature, we will consider the moral hazard problem arising from a costly
but unveriﬁable search activity. Furthermore, we argue that another informational problem,
largely neglected in the previous literature on optimal UI design, calls for attention. Speciﬁcally,
we will consider the case when some, but not all, unemployed can increase the probability of
being hired by undertaking a costly investment, e.g., by retraining or moving to a more a location
with better employment prospects. Under the assumption that the insurer is unable to observe
who has this option a realistic adverse selection problem arises.
There are reasons to believe that the adverse selection problem is of quantitative importance.
For instance, Bartel (1979) documents that the proportion of moves in the U.S. caused by the
decision to change jobs is one-half of all migration decisions for young workers and one third
of all migration decisions for workers above the age of 45. Other empirical documentations of
the link between unemployment and geographical mobility are DaVanzo (1978), Pissarides and
Wadsworth (1989) and McCormick (1997). Furthermore, geographical mobility is substantially
lower in continental Europe, possibly due to higher unemployment insurance — a mechanism
explored in Hassler, Rodr´ ıguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2002). Therefore, we argue
that it is important to analyze how the informational problem associated with geographical
mobility and similar cases aﬀect how UI should be designed.
In all cases, also when both types of asymmetric information are jointly present, we provide
analytical results. The key to analytical tractability under hidden savings is that with constant
absolute risk-aversion, search incentives are independent of asset holdings. However, the results
2The restriction to two-tier systems can arguably be interesting in itself, since many real world UI systems
have this feature, possibly due to political restrictions on system complexity.
3will crucially depend on riskaversion and access to markets for saving and borrowing and can
provide qualitative insights that may prove to be valuable also for more general preferences.
Therefore, we believe that our results can complement both numerical analysis and the optimal
contract framework.
The paper is organized as follows; the basic structure of the model is presented in section
2, the cases of moral hazard and adverse selection are analyzed separately in sections 3 and 4
respectively. In section 5, we analyze ﬁrst the case of moral hazard on the job and ﬁnally the case
when moral hazard and adverse selection are allowed simultaneously and section 6 concludes.
Some proofs are provided in the appendix, while others are available upon request.
2 The model
Consider an economy in continuous time where individuals can be employed or unemployed.
They have access to a capital market with an exogenous return r, equal to the subjective discount
rate (possibly including a positive probability of dying). An employed individual is said to be in
state 1, receiving an exogenous income, w. She loses her job with instantaneous probability q,
and enters into state 2, where she receives beneﬁts, denoted b2. To analyze the issue of whether
unemployment beneﬁts should be increasing or decreasing, we allow two beneﬁt levels, b2 and
b3.3 If b2 > (<)b3,w es a yt h a tb e n e ﬁts are decreasing (increasing) over time. The latter beneﬁt
level is given to individuals in state 3, who are denoted as long-term unemployed, while those
in state 2 are called short-term unemployed. To facilitate a simple presentation of the results,
we assume that an individual in state 2 enters state 3 with a constant instantaneous probability
f.4 Our main interpretation is that state 3 is an administrative state associated with long
unemployment duration; consequently, as a baseline case, we assume individuals who search to
h a v et h es a m eh i r i n gr a t e s ,h, in the two unemployment states. However, for completeness, we
will also consider the case when hiring rates are diﬀerent in the two states.
Unemployed individuals can aﬀect their hiring rate by costly and unobservable search activity,
creating informational problems making full insurance infeasible. Speciﬁcally, we will consider
two cases. The ﬁrst case is that search is costly, and unless individuals search, they will remain
unemployed. The second case is that unemployed individuals can make a costly investment
increasing their chances of becoming employed. However, this cost is prohibitively high for some
3Extending the analysis to any ﬁnite number of beneﬁt levels is straightforward.
4This assumption implies that seach incentives remain constant as long as the individual remain in state 2.
Notice that it is not the random duration that matters, but that incentives remain constant in the short-term
unemployment state. An alternative would be to use discrete time and assume that short-term UI beneﬁts are
paid for one period only as done by e.g., Cahuc and Lehmann (2000). Assuming that UI beneﬁts change after
some ﬁx e dp e r i o do ft i m ew o u l dm a k es e a r c hi n c e n t i v e sd e p e n do nt h er e m a i n i n gt i m eo fc u r r e n tb e n e ﬁts and
considerably complicate the analysis with little gain.
4individuals. Therefore, there is an adverse selection problem, where individuals with high costs
needs insurance while those with low costs should be induced to search.





where ct is consumption at time t and r the subjective discount rate. In order to facilitate
analytical solutions when individuals have access to markets for saving and borrowing, we choose
the CARA utility function
U (ct) ≡− e−γct,
where γ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
All individuals are born (enter the labor market) as employed without assets and are identical
at that point. The purpose of this paper is to characterize optimal unemployment insurance
under moral hazard. To his end, we want to remove other motives for unemployment beneﬁts,
in particular transfer motives and therefore assume that individuals face an actuarially fair
insurance. This means that when an individual enters the labor force, the expected present
discounted value of the beneﬁts she will receive during her life-time exactly balances the expected
present discounted value of her contributions. An alternative interpretation of actuarial fairness
is that in a decentralized equilibrium, actuarial fairness is identical to a break-even condition for
insurance companies, which would be satisﬁed under perfect competition.
Without loss of generality, we let individuals pay lump-sum taxes, denoted τ.W ed e n o t et h e









where µ2,t and µ3,t are the probabilities of being short term and long term unemployed at time
t, respectively, conditioned on being employed at time zero. Solving for the ADP’s in the base
line case when hiring rates are the same in both states yields5
5If, instead, hiring rates are h2 and h3,w eh a v e
Π2 =
(h3 + r)q




(ρ2 − r)(ρ1 − r)
,




F2 − 4(qf + h3 (f + h2 + q))
2
< 0,
where F ≡ f + q + h3 + h2
5Π2 = q
h + r






The actuarial fairness requirement of the UI system can then be written
τ = Π2b2 + Π3b3. (1)
2.1 Search costs
The insurer’s ability to provide insurance is hampered by asymmetric information. First, we
assume search activity to be costly — a cost of m per unit of time must be paid, otherwise the
hiring probability is zero. We may consider this cost as representing the opportunity cost of
searching, arising from some alternative economic activity. Whether the agent actually searches
or not is assumed to her own private information. Second, we assume that an unemployed
individual can undertake a costly investment, (re-training or moving). The cost is either low, ˜ m
(with probability p) or prohibitively high. For simplicity, we assume that if the unemployed pays
the cost, she is immediately rehired. Otherwise, she remains unemployed and decides whether
to search for a new job. To make the problem interesting, we assume parameters to be such that
it is optimal to induce search for all unemployed and investment for individuals with low costs.
3M o r a l h a z a r d
We start the analysis by assuming that individuals cannot save or borrow. The value function
of an employed individual, conditional on her searching when unemployed, is then given by
V1 = −eγτe−γw1 − Π2 − Π3 + Π2eγ∆2 + Π3eγ∆3
r
(2)
where ∆2 ≡ c1 − c2,∆3 ≡ c1 − c3 denotes the reduction in consumption for the short- and
long-run unemployed, relative to employed. It is straightforward to verify that that individuals
prefer ﬂat beneﬁt schedules under imperfect insurance.6 To see this, note that the slope of an
indiﬀerence curve in (∆2,∆3)s p a c ei sg i v e nb y
d∆2
d∆3
|V1=¯ V = −
Π3 (1 − Π3)eγ∆3 −
¡
1 − Π2 − Π3 + Π2eγ∆2¢
Π3
Π2 (1 − Π2)eγ∆2 − (1 − Π2 − Π3 + Π3eγ∆3)Π2
.
When ∆3 = ∆2,t h i ss i m p l i ﬁes to −Π3
Π2.Given a tax rate, the slope of the budget constraint
is also −Π3
Π2.T h u s ,∆2 = ∆3, requiring b2 = b3 is the optimum. In other words;
6Without additional constraints, full insurance is, of course, optimal. We therefore consider the optimal beneﬁt
proﬁle given a tax level insuﬃcient to provide full insurance.
6Proposition 1 When no moral hazard problem exists and there is no market for saving and
borrowing, UI beneﬁts should be constant over time.
Intuitively, when ∆2 = ∆3 and thus marginal utility is the same in states 2 and 3, the
marginal rate of substitution between ∆2 and ∆3, i.e., the slope of the indiﬀerence curve, equal
m i n u st h er a t i oo ft h eA D P ’ so ft h et w os t a t e ,t h a ti s−Π3
Π2.Furthermore, −Π3
Π2 is also the rate of
transformation between beneﬁts in the two states implied by the budget restriction (1).
Let us now introduce moral hazard by allowing individuals to abstain from searching if the
search incentive is too weak. In order to derive the incentive compatibility constraints, we ﬁrst
note that the incentive compatible value functions for the two states, V2 and V3,a r eg i v e nb y
V2 = −eγτe−γw
h



















where ∆2 = w−b2+m and ∆3 = w−b3+m since we continue to assume no saving or borrowing.








where V2,n is conditioned on searching in state 3.
The incentive compatibility constraint for the long-term unemployed (IC3) is then
V3 ≥ V3,n.
Using the above deﬁnitions, this can be rewritten as





























where we should note that Π2
1−Π3 is the slope of the IC3 constraint under risk neutrality and/or
under perfect insurance. Thus, higher search costs require higher ∆3 and/or lower ∆2 to induce
search. The positive eﬀect on search incentives of higher consumption in state 3 is the ”entitle-
ment” eﬀect (see Mortensen (1977)) — higher beneﬁts for short-term unemployed increase the
search incentives for the long-term unemployed since the latter ﬁrst need to become employed
to be entitled to these higher beneﬁts.
Now, consider the short-term unemployed. The incentive compatibility constraint for these
individuals (IC2) is
V2 ≥ V2,n
7which we can write as


















































h+r is the slope of the IC2 constraint under risk-neutrality and/or under perfect
insurance.7
The slope of the IC2 constraint is negative since a decrease in ∆2 achieved by an increase in
b2 reduces search incentives for the short-run unemployed and therefore needs to be compensated
by an increase in ∆3 achieved by a decrease in b3.




(1 − e−γm) r+h












The optimal contract maximizes V1 as given by (2) over ∆2 and ∆3, subject to the incentive
constraints (4) and (5) and the fairness constraint (1).
As wee see from (6), the slope of IC2 is necessarily steeper than the indiﬀerence curve at
∆2 = ∆3 = ¯ ∆, whenever risk-aversion is strictly positive and a strictly positive m prevents full
insurance. Therefore, ∆3 should optimally be larger than ∆2, requiring a downward-sloping
beneﬁts c h e d u l e .
We depict our results in Figure 1 and summarize in the following proposition;
Proposition 2 Under moral hazard and without markets for saving and borrowing, UI beneﬁts
should be decreasing over time.














IC2 curve has a ﬁnite slope in the positive quadrant of the space ∆2,∆3.T o s e e t h i s , s e t ∆2 =0i nt h eI C 2













Figure 1. Moral hazard and no savings.
This result is qualitatively similar to those of Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997), but the intuition is somewhat diﬀerent. At ∆2 = ∆3,o re q u i v a l e n t l yb2 = b3,
a non-deviator is indiﬀerent to small actuarial changes in b2 and b3 since her marginal utility
is the same in both states. In other words, the indiﬀerence curve has slope −∆3/∆2. Consider
now an individual who deviates by not searching in state 2 but will search in state 3. Clearly,
she will have higher marginal utility in state 3 than in state 2. Therefore, she will be harmed
by increases in actuarially fair reductions in b3. Optimal beneﬁts use this diﬀerence in relative
preferences for b2 and b3 to discourage deviation.
3.1 Saving
Consider now the case when individuals can self-insure via precautionary savings. As above,
we assume that there is a cost of searching and that the search only takes place if there are






ct,j = rAt + cj j ∈ {1,2,3}.
Note our abuse of notation; from now on, we let cj denote consumption net of permanent
income from current asset holding. The Bellman equation for the employed is satisﬁed if the
9constants cj, satisfy

























It is convenient to rewrite the second two equations of (7) as






























Notice that as in the no-savings case, there is a one-to-one mapping from (b2,b 3)t o( ∆2,∆3),
although in the case of savings, it in no longer by construction but a result of individual opti-
mization. As we will see, it is convenient to write the problem as if the insurer directly chooses
∆2 and ∆3, constrained by individual optimal optimization as given by (8).
Consider ﬁrst the problem of choosing beneﬁts, disregarding the incentive compatibility con-
straints. The optimal contract maximizes c1 (and therefore V1 (A) for any A)a sg i v e nb y( 7 )o v e r
∆2 and ∆3 subject to individual consumption choices as given by (8) and the fairness constraint
(1).8 It follows immediately that whenever ∆2 is positive in optimum (less than full insurance)
individuals prefer upward sloping beneﬁts. To see this, note that the ﬁrst-order condition for ∆3

















Clearly, this is not satisﬁed at ∆3 = ∆2, unless there is full insurance (∆3 = ∆2 =0 ) .
Instead, b3 should be increased until











Now, let us consider the incentive constraints. A long-run unemployed who does not search
consumes b3 − τ + rAt for ever, yielding a value of −1









c3 ≥ b3 − τ.
As we see, total consumption (c3+rAt), must be at least as large as net income (b3−τ+rAt).
This means that incentives have to be at least large enough to make the individual willing to
8As in the no-savings case, full insurance is of course optimal without any additional restrictions, so we assume
taxes are ﬁxed at a level insuﬃcient for providing full insurance.
10borrow to ﬁnance the search cost. This, in turn, means that consumption necessarily falls as
long as the individual remains unemployed.








≡ ˆ ∆(h). (10)
Note that while the search incentive in general depends on the extent to which the value
function increases when employment is gained, in this case, the incentive constraint can be
written as only depending on the extent to which consumption increases at re-employment. In
particular, consumption in state 2 and b2 have no separate eﬀects on search behavior in state
3. This does of course not mean that only b3 matters for search incentives. On the contrary,
both b2 and b3 aﬀect consumption in all states, as seen in (7). However, individual optimization
and access to markets for saving and borrowing imply the value function to be a monotonous
transformation of consumption. Thus, the wedge between consumption in the two states is a
suﬃcient statistic to determine if search incentives are suﬃciently strong. Furthermore, note
also that to induce search we need γrm < h.
For the short term unemployed, we compute the value associated with no search in state 2,
conditioned on searching in state 3. This is −e−γrAte
−γc2,n
r where c2,n satisﬁes






The IC2 constraint is c2 ≥ c2,n,which can be written as
∆2 ≥ ˆ ∆(h). (11)
The IC2 constraint is independent of ∆3 for the same reasons the IC3 constraint is inde-
pendent of ∆2, as discussed above. The optimal insurance contract should then be chosen to
maximize c1 as given by (7) over ∆2 and ∆3, subject to the incentive constraints (10) and (11),
individual consumption choices (8) and the actuarial fairness constraint (1).
Since the indiﬀerence curve in (∆2,∆3) has a negative slope at ∆2 = ∆3,t h eo p t i m a l
contract is the point at which IC3 crosses IC2.9 T h e r ew eh a v e∆2 = ∆2 = ˆ ∆(h)a n db2 = b3 =
w − ˆ ∆(h) −
mq
h−γrm.Substituting this into (7) yields, c2 = c3 = b2 − τ. We depict our results in
Figure 2 and and summarize as follows
Proposition 3 Under moral hazard and with markets for saving and borrowing, UI beneﬁts
should be constant over states at b2 = b3 = w − ˆ ∆(h) −
mq
h−γrm. The consumption of the
unemployed is equal to their income. The search cost is ﬁnanced by borrowing, implying falling
consumption over the unemployment spell. Optimal incentive compatible beneﬁts increase in h
and decrease and in m.
9The slope of an indiﬀence curve at ∆2 = ∆3 is given by −
Π3h(1−e−γ∆2)
Π2f+(1−Π2−Π3)q(eγ∆2−1)+Π2h(1−e−γ∆2) ≤ 0.
11Proof: Follows from the text, expect for the last result, which is derived from diﬀerentiating
w − ˆ ∆(h) −
mq
h−γrm and using h>γ r m .
D2
IC3
D3 ˆ() h ∆
IC2 ˆ() h ∆
Figure 2. Moral hazard with savings.
To obtain some intuition for the results, we once more note that in general, search incentives
arise from a comparison of expected lifetime utility (the value function) under diﬀerent search
strategies. When individuals have access to a capital market for saving and borrowing, however,
there is a one-to-one mapping between consumption and the value function. In contrast to the
no savings case, we cannot increase the search incentive in state 3 for a given level of ∆3 by
reducing ∆2. Similarly, in state 2, and given ∆2 the search incentive cannot be strengthened by
increasing ∆3. In other words, the two constraints are independent and both should be satisﬁed
with equality. As we have assumed hiring rates to be the same in both states, beneﬁts should
be constant.10
4 Adverse selection
As above, the value functions are of the form −1
re−γ(rAt+cj) for the three states indexed by
j, and consumption is given by rAt + cj unless the individual invests, in which case assets fall
discontinuously by ˜ m. Recalling that individuals loosing their job have the option of investing
with probability p, it is straightforward to show that the incentive compatible consumption
10In fact, in an unpublished paper, Werning (2002) shows in a similiar setting that constant beneﬁts are optimal
under CARA utility in a general class of UI-schemes.
12constants must satisfy
c1 = w − τ − q
peγr˜ m +( 1− p)eγ∆2 − 1
γr
(12)










Noting that when the incentive constraints are satisﬁed, the ﬂow into unemployment is
(1 − p)q,w eﬁnd that the ADPs of being short-term and long-term unemployed, respectively,
are given by
¯ Π2 ≡ q (1 − p)
h + r
(r + h + q(1 − p))(r + h + f)
, (13)




Now, the incentive compatibility constraint under adverse selection (ICA) is that individuals








∆2 ≥ r ˜ m,
which is independent of assets. Now, since the insurance is actuarially fair and individuals are
risk averse, the ICA condition will surely bind at the optimal tax rate, in which case r ˜ m = ∆2,
giving c1 = w − τ − q e
γr ˜ m−1
γr ,a n d
b2 = w − r ˜ m − q





1 − e−γr˜ m
γr
− f




b3 = w − ∆3 − q






Optimal beneﬁts then maximize c1 as given by (12), subject to the incentive constraint (14),
the individual consumption choices (15) and the actuarial fairness condition τ = ¯ Π2b2 + ¯ Π3b3.
Clearly, ICA will bind, ﬁxing the diﬀerence in consumption between states 1 and 2 (∆2 = r ˜ m),
implying that c1 = w − τ − q eγr ˜ m−1
γr . Therefore, the problem reduces to minimize taxes, given
the constraints. The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem can be written








The LHS of this is increasing in ∆3, negative at ∆3 = 0 and positive at ∆3 = r ˜ m.T h e














13is therefore such that 0 ≤ ∆3 ≤ ∆2 = r ˜ m, with equality only if ˜ m =0 . Using (15), we ﬁnd that
b2 − b3 =( ∆3 − r ˜ m)+f








Our results are depicted in Figure 3, and summarized in the following proposition;
Proposition 4 Under adverse selection and access to markets for saving and borrowing, beneﬁts




Figure 3. Adverse selection with savings.
The intuition here is that the IC constraint associated with the adverse selection problem puts
a wedge between the value of being employed and short-run unemployed, and therefore between
consumption in these states. However, the relative preferences for b2 and b3 i st h es a m ef o ra
deviator and a non-deviator. In contrast to the case of moral hazard and no savings, diﬀerences
in relative preferences of the two beneﬁt levels cannot be used to strengthen the incentive to
invest. Therefore, there is no point in not satisfying the preference for upward sloping beneﬁts in
the case when investment costs are high. In a sense, insurance should be (constrained) eﬃcient in
the choice of relative insurance for long-term and short-term insurance. However, full insurance
for long-term unemployed cannot be optimal since a marginal reallocation from long-term to
short-term unemployed, when the former but not the latter have full insurance, must improve
the constrained eﬃciency of the insurance.
144.1 Adverse selection and no saving
To understand the results on adverse selection, we want to analyze the case of no savings in
a setting as close to the case of savings as possible. This poses a technical problem, since
investments are hard to model when there are no savings. To keep as close to the savings case as
possible, in particular that the investment cost is monetary and that there are three employment
states only, we make the following assumption; the investment cost is a loss of income ˜ m during
a short period of time. Formally, we assume the period of lower consumption to be a unitary
masspoint of time.11 This assumption corresponds to a discre t et i m ec a s ew h e nc o n s u m p t i o nf a l l s
by an amount ˜ m during one period if the investment is undertaken. This means that the value
function falls by an amount
¡
e−γ(w−τ− ˜ m) − e−γ(w−τ)¢
if the individual decides to undertake the
investment and the cost is low.
Now, the incentive compatibility constraint V1 −
¡
e−γ(w−τ− ˜ m) − e−γ(w−τ)¢












eγ ˜ m − 1
¢
q(1 − p)
h + r + q
h + r + q(1 − p)
Clearly, the slope of this constraint is the same as the indiﬀerence curve if and only if ∆3 = ∆2.
Thus, beneﬁts should be ﬂat under adverse selection and no savings.
Proposition 5 Under adverse selection and no access to markets for saving and borrowing,
beneﬁts should be constant over time.
The intuition for our results is the same as under savings; the IC constraint puts a wedge
between the value of the employed and the short-term unemployed. However, this does not call
for not satisfying the preferences of the unemployed with high investment costs, which is to have
constant beneﬁt si nt h ec a s eo fn os a v i n g s . T h ei n s u r a n c es h o u l db ee ﬃcient in the relative
insurance of the long- and short-term unemployed.
11Alternative assumptions would require an additional state.
12The expressions for the value functions are given in the appendix.
155S o m e e x t e n s i o n s
5.1 Moral hazard on the job
The model is very easy to extend to allow for, e.g., moral hazard on the job. Suppose that
there is an eﬀort cost ˆ m associated with working. If an individual produce eﬀort, she will loose
her job with probability q. If shirking, there is a detection probability of δ. Then, the incentive
compatible consumption constants are,

























while c2 and c3 are given by (12). An individual who considers deviation in the current employ-
ment, instead has optimal labor income consumption given by

























observability of eﬀort, i.e., δ<∞, reduces consumption relative to the ﬁr s tb e s tb ya na m o u n t
ˆ mq/δ.
A si nt h ec a s eo fa d v e r s es e l e c t i o n ,o p t i m a lb e n e ﬁts minimize taxes over ∆3.T h eﬁrst order















5.2 Moral hazard, adverse selection and diﬀerent hiring rates
Finally, let us analyze the more general case when hiring rates are allowed to be diﬀerent in
the two unemployment states (denoted h2 and h3), and when we have both moral hazard and
16adverse selection.13 The consumption constants satisfy
c1 = w − τ − q
peγr˜ m +( 1− p)eγ∆2 − 1
γr
, (21)











the ICA constraint remains ∆2 ≥ r ˜ m and the IC2 and IC3 constraint are ∆2 ≥ ˆ ∆(h2)a n d
∆3 ≥ ˆ ∆(h3), respectively.
We now have two cases. First, when the adverse selection problem is small, speciﬁcally,
if ˆ ∆(h2) ≥ r ˜ m, the ICA constraint is satisﬁed whenever IC2 is satisﬁed. Then, the optimal
contract sets ∆2 = ˆ ∆(h2)a n d∆3 = ˆ ∆(h3), implying from (21) that
b3 = w − ˆ ∆(h3) − q







b2 = w − ˆ ∆(h2) − q











Since ˆ ∆0 (h) < 0, we have that h2 > (≤)h3 =⇒ b2−b3 = ˆ ∆(h3)− ˆ ∆(h2)+fm h2−h3
h2h3−mrγh2 >
(≤)0.
Second, if the adverse selection problem is relatively strong, i.e., ˆ ∆(h2) <r˜ m, IC2 is satisﬁed
when ICA is satisﬁed. Then, the optimal contract is ∆2 = r ˜ m and ∆3 = ˆ ∆(h3). Using this in
(21) implies,
b3 = w − q
eγr˜ m − 1
γr
− ˆ ∆(h3)
b2 = w − r ˜ m + m − h2




h3−γrme−γr˜ m − 1
γr
− q
eγr˜ m − 1
γr
In this case,
b2 − b3 = m − r ˜ m + h2




h3−γrme−γr˜ m − 1
γr
+ ˆ ∆(h3).
As we see, the beneﬁtp r o ﬁle is more increasing (more negative b2 − b3) the smaller are
m and h2 and the larger are ˜ m and h3. In other words, an adverse selection problem that is
strong relative to the moral hazard problem and increasing (decreasing) hiring rates, calls for
increasing beneﬁts. When ˆ ∆(h2)=r ˜ m and h2 = h3, we already know that optimally, b2 = b3.
Consequently, if ˜ m is increased from this point, the beneﬁtp r o ﬁle becomes upward-sloping.
Furthermore, for a suﬃciently low h3,b e n e ﬁts should be downward sloping. The results are
13If there is both an adverse selection constraint and an incentive compatibility constraint for moral hazard in
eﬀort, the former (latter) is the relevant constraint if 1
γ ln
γr ˆ m
δ < (>)r ˜ m.
17depicted in Figure 4. An increase in ˜ m shifts the ICA constraint upwards, similarly, a decrease
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Figure 4. Strong moral hazard and falling hiring rates (left). Strong adverse selection and
increasing hiring rates (right).
Summarizing
Proposition 6 When the adverse selection problem is relatively small (ˆ ∆(h2) ≥ r ˜ m),b e n e ﬁts
should be decreasing iﬀ t h eh i r i n gr a t e sa r ed e c r e a s i n g(h2 >h 3).
When the adverse selection problem is relatively high, ˆ ∆(h2) <r˜ m, beneﬁts should be increas-
ing for non-decreasing hiring rates. For suﬃciently decreasing hiring rates, beneﬁts should be
decreasing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a tractable model where risk averse individuals face unem-
ployment risk that cannot be completely insured against due to various forms of asymmetric
information. It has been shown that access to savings has important qualitative eﬀects on the
time proﬁle of optimal unemployment beneﬁts. The model provided a number of analytical
results.
First, access to savings imply that individuals tend to prefer increasing beneﬁts. Since indi-
vidual assets are depleted during the unemployment spell, consumption tends to fall and marginal
utility increase. Therefore, it is particularly important to have good insurance against long un-
employment spells. In other words, precautionary savings is a good (bad) substitute for short
18(long) spells of unemployment.
Second, moral hazard problems arising from unobservable search eﬀort may call for decreasing
beneﬁts if the insurer can control individual consumption, i.e., when there is no (hidden) savings.
However, if, realistically, the insurer cannot control consumption, this is no longer necessarily
the case. The reason is that individual consumption choices imply that search incentives have
a one-to-one relation to the expected consumption increase associated with ﬁnding a job. If
search productivity and the search cost are constant over time, the incentive to search should
also be constant. This calls for a consumption increase at employment that is independent of the
duration of the unemployment period, which is implemented by constant beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally,
search incentives should be strong enough to induce the individual to borrow (or dissave) to
ﬁnance the search cost. The reason for this result is that a deviator, who does not search, would
consume his current income and the non-deviator must have at least as high consumption for
incentive compatibility to be satisﬁed.
Third, we have analyzed the case when individuals can aﬀect the hiring probability by an
up-front investment, e.g., retraining or moving. When the adverse selection problem arising from
this is strong, the beneﬁtp r o ﬁle is optimally increasing. The intuition here is straightforward —
the adverse selection problem calls for a separation of individuals with low and high investment
costs. However, since a deviator with low costs have the same relative preference for long-run
and short-run beneﬁts, a beneﬁtp r o ﬁle that provides an ineﬃcient insurance should not be used
to provide incentives to invest. Instead the unemployed individuals’ preference for increasing
beneﬁts should be satisﬁed.
Finally, the beneﬁtp r o ﬁle is sensitive to how search productivity changes over the unemploy-
ment spell. If search productivity tends to fall, beneﬁts should also be falling.
Let us conclude by some speculations on the consequences of allowing constant relative risk-
aversion. In such a case, the analysis is greatly complicated by the fact that, in general, search
incentives would depend on asset holdings. Therefore, incentive compatibility would not in
general be consistent with a ﬁnite number of beneﬁts that are independent of individual asset
holdings. However, the intuition for the results in this paper appear not to be related to such
eﬀects. For example, the preference for increasing beneﬁts depends on the fact that individual
assets are depleted during unemployment, which is true for general speciﬁcations of utility, in
particular for CRRA, as shown in e.g., Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora (1999). Similarly, the result
that incentives have to be large enough to induce borrowing to ﬁnance the search cost relies on
the existence of capital markets rather than on the exact speciﬁcation of preferences. Therefore,
the mechanisms analyzed here are likely be present also under more general preference speciﬁ-
cations. However, since search incentives in general depend on asset holdings and the duration
of unemployment is likely to be correlated with the individual’s asset holdings, unobservability
of the latter may have consequences for optimal beneﬁtt i m ep r o ﬁles. For example, if the search
19incentives are reinforced as wealth decumulates and individuals with long unemployment spells
are likely to have less wealth, this might call for increasing beneﬁts.
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Solving these equations yields (2) and (3).
7.1 Savings





e−γ(rAt+c1) =m a x
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Adding 1



















−re−γ(c−c3) + r + γr(b3 − c − m − τ)+h + he−γ(c1−c3)
o
.
Equations (22) and (23) are maximized at c = cj, implying that for the Bellman equation to
be satisﬁed, the constants cj, must satisfy























22The IC2 constraint is given by
c2 − c2,n ≥ 0.
Furthermore,




























≡ R(c2 − c2,n)







γreγ(∆3−∆2) (achieved as c2 −c2,n approaches inﬁnity), approaches inﬁnity as




. The solution to (24) is














To ﬁnd the indiﬀerence curves, we consider the problem
max
∆2,∆3






τ = Π2b2 + Π3b3
































































































reγ∆2 + q eγ∆2
r
,
which is strictly positive when ∆3 =0 , given that ∆2 > 0.
237.2 Moral hazard on the job
The incentive constraint c1 − c1,n ≥ 0, where
























≡ ˆ R(c1 − c1,n).




γr (achieved as c1 − c1,n approaches inﬁnity), approaches inﬁnity as c1 − c1,n
approaches minus inﬁnity and R(0) = −ˆ m +
δ(eγ∆2−1)
γr .
The solution to c1 −c1,n is the unique ﬁxed-point of ˆ R.This value is non-negative if and only
if −ˆ m +
δ(eγ∆2−1)








7.3 Adverse selection and no saving
We can write the value functions when the individuals are undertaking the investments as
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where ¯ Π2 and ¯ Π3 are deﬁned in (13).
The positive solution to




























i) increases in ∆3, ii) is negative at ∆3 = 0 and iii) is positive
at ∆3 = r ˜ m, the solution is larger than zero but smaller than r ˜ m.
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